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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
by
Charles W. Webster* and John L. FitzGerald**
I. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

In Avery v. Midland County' the supreme court held that the Texas
and United States Constitutions were violated by a reapportionment and
redistricting order of the Midland county commissioners which gave one
of the four precincts ninety-five per cent of the population and grossly
disparate land area and taxable values. The court held that equality of
population is not the sole criteria and that other factors may be considered
by the c6mmissioner's courts in drawing precinct lines. The court said:
[T]he convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a
county may require-and constitutionally justify-a rational variance from
equality in population in commissioners' precincts upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values. The trial court in its
judgment found that such considerations could have been taken into account
in the precinct division in Midland County, notwithstanding which it ordered
a redistricting to achieve substantial equality of population.

The supreme court emphasized that developments during recent years
have placed urban responsibilities on cities and rural responsibilities on
counties, and the population balance must take these things into account.
Thus the growth of population must be reflected in precinct population
distribution in order to comply with article 5, section 18, of the Texas
Constitution,' but certain rural concerns can also be taken into consideration such as roads, bridges, and taxable values of large land areas, which
disproportionately concern the rural areas. The court held that the requirements of the Texas constitutional provision must be construed and
enforced in consistency with the equal protection clause. It also observed
that it has not been settled whether the "one man, one vote" holdings of
the United States Supreme Court apply to subordinate governmental units.
These holdings concerned only legislative and congressional reapportionment. The county, though, is a unit exercising chiefly administrative powers. Its legislative functions are negligible, and county government is not
* Ph.B., Marquette University; LL.B., University of Wisconsin. Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
** B.A., LL.B., University of Washington; LL.M., Harvard University; S.J.D., Georgetown
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 691.
a TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
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otherwise comparable to the legislature of a state or to the federal congress. Therefore, the court believed that the "equal protection under the
law" requirements of the United States Constitution does not make population the sole basis for division of counties into precincts. The court recognized that there are recent state and federal cases which hold that the
"one man, one vote" rule applies to subordinate governmental units, the
basis for such a holding, however, varying from case to case.'
Home-Rule Cities. A quo warranto action challenged the constitutionality of a home-rule charter as part of an attack upon the validity of the
annexation ordinances in State ex rel. Rose v. City of LaPorte.4 The supreme court held that the city's finding, in 1949, that it had a population
of more than 5,000 enabled it to adopt a home-rule charter pursuant to
article 11, section 5 of the Texas Constitution and article 1165 of the civil
statutes. This finding was conclusive, absent allegations and proof of
fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. Under the constitutional homerule grant of power, a city is not restricted to census reports available only
once in ten years. Since the statute prescribed no special method for determining population, the municipal governing body had implied authority
to determine the facts. However, the annexation was declared invalid because the description of the annexed property could not be closed with
respect to'boundary lines.'
A collateral attack was made by taxpayers on certain municipal annexation ordinances in Deacon v. City of Euless.6 The ordinances were pending
before.the city on March 15, 1963, and were adopted on June 25, 1963.'
'In some states there is a constitutional or statutory re.quirment that apportionment of subordinate governmental units be on the basis of population. Seaman v. Fedourich, 209 N.E.2d 7"78
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1965) (constitutional provision); Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 405 P.2d 857
(Cal. 1965)--(statute requires districts to be "as nearly equal in population as may be"). Some

cases stress the similarity which exists between the selection of state and subordinate legislative
bodies. Ellis v. Mayor, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965) (city wards); Bianchi v. Grifling, 238 F.
Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (county districting); Goldstein v. Rockefeller, 257 N.Y. Sup. 994
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (county districting). Where the subordinate unit has a legislative, rather than
an administrative function, the "one man, one vote" rule has been said to apply. Mauk v. Hoffman,
209 A.2d 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965) (multi-county government); State v. Sylvester, 132 N.W.2d
249 (Wise. 1965) (county districting); Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966) (county
districting). In one case redistricting was denied because the plaintiff lacked standing, but in
dictum it was announced that the "one man, one vote" rule does apply to subordinate governmental
units. Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
For two recent discussions of the county apportionment 'problem, see Dixon, New Constitutional
Forms for Metropolis; Reapportioned County Boards; Local Councils of Governments, 30 LAW &
CONTEM'. PROB. 57 (1965); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLo. L. REV. 21 (1965). For discussions
of the Avery case during its pendency on appeal before the Texas Supreme Court, see Davis, The
Implications of Baker v. Carr on the County Commissioners Court of Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REV.
41 (1965); Oden & Meek, County Reapportionment: A Rebuttal, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 15 (1966).
'386 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. 1965).
SSee also on the latter point, Slattery v. Caldwell Township, 199 A.2d 670 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1964) voiding a rezoning due to vagueness of a boundary description which referred only to "Proposed Federal Highway 180."
6405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1966).
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The plaintiffs, taxpayers, contended that the city was without power to
enact them due to section 7 of article 970a, which states that a city may
annex only territory equivalent to ten per cent of ,its area in any one calendar year. It was contended that the area annexed by the challenged
ordinances, together with other land annexed during 1963, totaled more
than ten per cent of the area of Euless on January 1, 1963. Section 7(d)
provides that the limitations of the statute as to size and extent of areas
to be annexed shall be binding on cities as of March 15, 1963. The city's
position was that article 970a was enacted by the legislature on May 14,
1963, and did not become effective until August 23, 1963; that, even
though the annexations violated the statutory limitations, the limitations
did not then apply since the statute could not be given retroactive effect.
The court held the city's position incorrect, stating that although statutes
are generally given prospective effect, the controlling question is the intention of the legislature. Here, there was an expressed intention to have
the statute take effect as of March 15, 1963. Since the statute applied to
this ordinance, the ordinance was found void. The court gave a traditional
answer to the argument that the statute violated article 1, section 7 of the
constitution which says that no retroactive law shall be made. The court
said that this section prohibits retroactive laws which destroy or impair
vested rights. Since municipal corporations -do not acquire vested rights
against the state, the constitutional provision was not violated.
The city also contended that the statute was in violation of the homerule amendment of the constitution in that it interfered with the right of
home-rule cities to annex territory. The court pointed out that the homerule amendment preserved the priority of the general laws of the- state
over inconsistent ordinances passed by home-rule cities, and thus nothing
in the constitution limited the power of the legislature to curb annexation
powers of home-rule cities.! The court further held that if the territory
sought to be annexed by the city exceeds the limits prescribed by the legislature, the ordinances are in direct violation of article 970a and are void.
A taxpayer may maintain a suit to challenge the validity of ordinances
which are utterly void because not authorized by law or color of law, and
the remedy in such a case would not be limited to quo warranto proceedings.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas8 emphasized again that homerule cities in Texas "have full authority to do anything the legislature could
have authorized them to do prior to adoption of the Home-Rule Amendment, the result being that it is not necessary to look to the acts of the
7

TEx. CONST. art. 11, § S.
s 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

legislature for grants of power to such cities, but only for limitations on
their powers.'"
II.

GENERAL POWERS

The court of criminal appeals upheld a speeding ordinance in part and
voided it in part, but affirmed the conviction. The state statutes prohibit
driving on the highways at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the circumstances, or at any speed in excess of limits prescribed by
the statutes, the State Highway Commission or municipalities (within
their limits). In Ex parte Devereaux ° an ordinance provided a speed limit; punishment for violation of the ordinance was established as a fine not
to exceed two hundred dollars. However, the statutes provided that punishment for speeding shall be a fine of not less than one dollar, or more
than two hundred dollars. Though this variance was slight, the court
held that the variation from the statutory penalty invalidated that part
of the ordinance because the statute could be implemented but not altered.
The speed limit established in the ordinance was upheld, with the violation
punishable under the statutory penalty provision. The court cited the
Texas home-rule constitutional provision,"' which forbids ordinances or
charters of home-rule cities from containing provisions inconsistent with
the general laws."
III. POLICE POWER

A Texas court of civil appeals, following a de novo trial in the district
court, held that a Dallas movie classification ordinance, directed chiefly to
the prevention of exhibition of pictures "not suitable for- young persons"
(under sixteen years of age) was lawfully applied to bar the exhibition of
the film Viva Maria to such persons." In a proceeding brought -by Interstate Circuit, Inc. in a federal district court for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, the ordinance
was sustained with the exception of one provision. The exception related
Old.

at 777.

"0389 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
" TEx. CONST. art. 11, S 5.

"*For an informative article, see Ruud, Legislative Jurisdiction of Home Rule Cities, 37 T~xAs
L. REv. 682 (1959). See also Port Arthur Independent School Dist. v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d
330 (Tex. 1964), holding that enforcement of city building code as applied to new building undertaken by independent school district under the state school laws was not inconsistent with the
general laws which were silent upon the subject. See also Anderson v. Grossenbacher, 381 S.W.2d
72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e., holding mandamus not available to charter drafting
commission against county commissioners to compel them to call an election on a proposed county
home rule charter; failure to have a statutory quorum present at one of the five public hearings
required by statute invalidates the preliminary procedure required by the Home Rule Statute, the
quorum requirement being more than a parliamentary rule.
aInterstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref.
n.r.C.

-
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to the provision for revocation or suspension of the exhibitor's license (a
provision reserved by the court of civil appeals for future decision when
involved in a case before it) if the exhibitor showed for a period of up to
one year pictures classified as "not suitable," such provision being deemed a
denial of the right to exhibit films not obscene to an adult audience."
Stress is laid in both opinions upon (1) a distinction between the police
power exercisable over children's activities as compared with that permissible over adults', (2) the expedited timetable for administrative hear-

ing and judicial review," (3) the full administrative hearing accorded,
(4) the reasonableness of the ordinance in the light of the legislative objective and the connection of the latter with available data related to "societal
evil," (5.)
the home-rule authority of the city of Dallas and the nonpreemptive nature of existing general law, and (6) identification of the
contemporary community standard established with contemporary national community standards.
Though there is much in common between the views taken by the state
court decision and the Fifth Circuit decision,, there are also important differences, the chief of which is their approach to the validity of the legislative standards contained in the ordinance. In general, the term "not suitable for young persons" forms the operative term of the ordinance."6 This
term is the subject of a lengthy definition which, in paraphrase, forms the
basis for regulation of films which portray (1) sexual relations in a manner likely, in the judgment of the Board, to encourage delinquency or
sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interest, or (2) brutality, criminal violence or depravity in a manner
likely to encourage crime or delinquency on the part of young persons.
The federal court upheld the ordinance only as to (1) above, interpreting
the sense of (1) to reach only to obscenity (although this word was not
used in the ordinance), though considering that a broader concept of obscenity would be permissible insofar as the effect on young persons would
be the guide." The state court upheld the ordinance as to both (1) and
(2). Since "obscenity" has had more United States Supreme Court approval as a standard than has "violence" or other factors in (2), the state
(N.D. Tex. 1965).
"' As a matter of interest upon the factor of expedited process, the motion picture 'Viva Maria
was classified "unsuitable for young persons" by the Board on February 7, 1966; the suit was filed
by the city February 14, 1966; the hearing on the temporary injunctions was begun on February
17; the temporary injunction was granted by the local district court on February 18, 1966; and
the opinion on appeal was rendered by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals April 5, 1966. In the
Fifth Circuit proceeding the court noted that the city of Dallas cannot by ordinance compel state
courts to afford speedy relief. Cf., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-61 (1965). The Fifth
Circuit decision observed, however, that if the courts are willing to cooperate, Freedman's requirement for speedy judicial action on the merits and on review is satisfied.
'a 249 F. Supp. at 26 (exhibit).
"'Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966).
14 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19
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court perforce gave more attention to the question of vague standards. It
emphasized the fact that a de novo trial and independent judicial determination were had in the trial court, and further emphasized that a film
deemed not suitable was not barred for exhibition to adults but only to
children of the defined ages. There is a question whether de novo review"
is adequate to supply legislative standards, but there have been occasions
when the United States Supreme Court has so indicated"
Touching upon the non-employment in the ordinance of the words
"obscene" or "obscenity," the concurring opinion in the state court said
in part:2"
Conveying to young persons the idea that to be able to enjoy the pleasures of
sexual gratification without being burdened with any accompanying responsibility or commitment, and with no retributive consequence, or the
slightest remorse, is acceptable behavior according to accepted standards of
the American community, would in my opinion have a much more pernicious
effect on the morals of the community than mere obscenities. To say that a
community is powerless to protect itself and its youth from such damage
because of the constitutional safeguards of free speech is to my mind unconscionable and unacceptable.
Both parties have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari in the federal case, and Interstate has also petitioned the
United States Supreme Court in the state case. The Supreme Court has not
acted upon these petitions as of this date. 1
IV.

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

As of November 1, 1966, the Department of Housing and Urban Development reported it had made a $50,496 grant to tle North Central
Texas Regional Planning Commission, to aid the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area in its program of comprehensive planning for growth and
development. Article 1011m strengthens the ability of local governmental
units to cooperate and coordinate their planning efforts with emphasis
upon their common needs in broad respects defined by the statute. It de" 402 S.W.2d at 774-45. There is no statute providing for judicial review. The ordinance (No.
in § 46A-7 provides in part:
(a) . . . the Board shall have the burden to present evidence sufficient to convince
the court of the reasonableness of its classification.
(b) The filing of such notice of non-acceptance shall not suspend or set aside the
Board's order [of classification], but such order shall be suspended at the end of
fifteen days after the filing of such notice unless an injunction is issued within such
period. ...
247 F. Supp. at 916 (exhibit).
" This has found expression in cases upholding broad standards because the statute in question
provided for judicial review of administrative action under the standards, protecting against arbitrary action. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
20 402 S.W.2d at 778.
"See also Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966).
10963)
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prives no local governmental unit of existing power or authority. Rather,
it extends the previously narrower applicability of the planning statute to
counties or parts thereof."
In 1965 the Texas legislature adopted a law permitting municipalities
in counties having a population of more than one million inhabitants, if
the municipality does not have a zoning ordinance, to enjoin violations of
restrictions contained or incorporated by reference in recorded plats or
other instruments affecting subdivisions within the municipalities. 3 The
term "restrictions" is defined by the act. Two exceptions are made: (1)
violations of restrictions placed on the land prior to the effective date of
the act are not enjoinable so long as "the nature of the violation remains
unchanged,"' and (2) the municipality may not enforce a restriction (as
it obviously could not in any event) "that violates the Constitution of the
United States or of this State. '
V.

MUNICIPAL FUNDS AND OTHER PROPERTY

In City of Port Arthur v. Tillnan," the supreme court considered and
rejected the argument that article 5544 applies the two-year statute of
limitations to cities, since such article was a part of title 91 which expressly
provides that rights of incorporated cities shall not be barred by any of
the provisions of the title. The court also rejected the contention of the
respondents-that the city of Port Arthur was taking over Water District No. 11 for the purpose of engaging in a proprietary enterprise, hence
article 5517 of title 91 should not be construed to immunize the city
from the statutes of limitations, as it would be unconstitutional as an unreasonable classification and would be in conflict with the equal protection
of the law clauses of the Texas and Federal Constitutions- holding that
the classification was not unreasonable.
It has been said in a number of cases that a property owner has the right
22 For the impact of new municipal annexation law upon extraterritorial planning of cities,
see Chapman, The Texas Municipal Annexation Act, 29 TEXAS B.J. 165 (1966). See for a
timely and practical discussion of one local development under the recently expanded regional
planning commission law, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011m, §§ 1-8 (Supp. 1966), repealing
former art. 1011-11 Tex Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. See also MacMaster, North Central Texas Council
of Governments: Local Government in the Regional Manner, 29 TEXAs B.J. .11 (1966).
1aTEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974a-1 (Supp. 1966). See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 974-2 (Supp. 1966), applicable to cities having a population of more than 900,000, containing an additional enforcement tool in the form of permit requirements for commercial construction in subdivisions as controlled by article 974a.
"TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974a-1, § 3 (Supp. 1966). For a comprehensive discussion
of the history of and legal problems inherent in the provisions of this law, see Susman, Municipal
Enforcement of Private Restrictive Covenants: An Innovation in Land-Use Control, 44 TEXAS L.
REV. 741

(1966).

2 Ibid.
9 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 199 (Jan. 19, 1966) (city, upon annexing a water district, alleged it succeeded to powers, assets, and liabilities of the district including alleged cause of action against
directors of the district).
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of access to any street abutting his property." But some cases"S restricted
this right by balancing police power traffic considerations against the
question of whether the' remaininig access to an owner is reasonable. In a
case decided last year, a Texas city closed a portion of the street on which
the plaintiff's property abutted in order to make way for a viaduct exit
from a nearby highway. This left the plaintiff with only an indirect access
and exit to a cross street by use of his alley. The supreme court, in Du Puy
v. City of Waco carefully considered the plaintiff's situation and found
there was a taking by the city which entitled the plaintiff to damages."
The court held an abutter has a property right consisting of an easement
of access, though this does not prevent the city from destroying some of
his access rights so long as adequate access is preserved. For example, in an
earlier case the Texas court permitted the city, subject to trial of the facts,
to deprive a garage owner of access to a heavily traveled street from one
side of his property, since he had access remaining to another street from
the other side of his property. It is to be noted also that the Texas Constitution provides for recovery for "damage" as well as for "taking."'" In
a companion case to Du Puy, no recovery was allowed, since the plaintiff
had other direct access to the street.3 '
A civil appeals decision 3 involved a declaratory judgment action to
determine whether or not a general law city had the authority to construct and maintain a sewage disposal plant within the limits of a homerule city in the absence of the consent of the latter. The city of Allen, a
general law city, selected a site for a new sewage disposal plant and instituted plans to acquire the property by negotiation and eminent domain.
When the city of Plano learned of this, it annexed the situs. For purposes
of the case the annexation was assumed to be valid. The issue then arose
as to whether Allen had the right to acquire property within Piano for
the purpose of constructing a. sewage disposal plant without first obtaining the consent of the governing body of Plano. It was held that the
operation of a sewage system is a governmental, not a proprietary function, and that Texas statutes do not expressly grant to any municipal corporation the right to own and operate a sewage disposal plant within the
2' 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW S 9.12 (1966).
21

City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking, Inc.,

158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.2d 218

(Tex.

1958); City of Miami v. Girtman, 104 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See comparison of
cases in ABA Local Govt. Law Section, Annual Report of the Committee on Ordinances and
Administrative Regulation, Municipal Law Serv. Letter 40 (Dec. 1959).
9396 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1965), 20 Sw. L.J. 393 (1966).
"' City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking, Inc., 158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.2d 218, 73 A.L.R.2d
640 (19$8).
3t
See Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 393 (1966).
"'Archenhold Auto. Supply Co. v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1965).
aCity of Piano v. City of Allen, 395 S.W.2d 927 (Tex Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.mr.e.
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city limits of another city." Therefore, such authority to be exercised
must be implied. Militating against implication of such an authority, in the
view of the court, were these considerations: (1) If the matter is doubtful
as to whether one municipal corporation has the right to enter upon the
boundaries of another in the pursuance of a public undertaking, that doubt
should be resolved adversely to any ex parte exercise of power; (2) homerule cities have statutory control and jurisdiction over streets and alleys
to widen, alter and lengthen them. Since the land in question was undeveloped, the construction proposed by Allen would limit the right of
Plano to control the location of streets and alleys in its future development and to appropriately carry out its powers under the zoning statutes.
A civil appeals case discussed a situation where a statute provided that
a water district could construct a dam that would result in the inundation
of a county road." The statute provided further that, in such event, the
commissioners' court should "change" the road so that it could be used,
and the expense of making this change would be borne by the water district. In this case the change made by the commissioners' court was to elevate the old road, rather than to reroute it around the body of water created by the new dam. The court determined as a matter of law that the
term "change" in the statute was not restricted to a horizontal change, as
contended by the water district. The court held that the commissioners'
court action under the statute was an exercise of discretion which the appellate court on review could examine for caprice. It could not substitute
judicial judgment for the judgment of the county. The county was not
bound to consider only elements of cost to the district, but it could take
into consideration the facts of convenience to the public, causing the substitute road to serve substantially the same purpose as its predecessor. The
cause was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
VI.

MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY

While the concept of governmental immunity seems to be so completely
a part of Texas jurisprudence that it probably will be necessary for the
legislature to change our traditional form of approaching this problem, it
is interesting to note that the supreme court may destroy the doctrine of
charitable immunity, a doctrine which was judicially created,- as was the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
a4See 2

ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 19.15

(1965).

" Live Oak County v. Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist., 396 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
38Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 163.
But see, Milner v. Huntsville Memorial Hosp., 398 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.-r.e. As the doctrine of charitable immunities is a matter of judge-made law and therefore the
courts have the power to abrogate it, it is unlikely the courts will take the same approach when
it comes to municipal corporations. See generally Note, Charitable Immunity in Texas Reconsidered, 20 Sw. L.J. 163 (1966).
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Texas continues to determine liability for tort on the basis of the function in which the municipal corporation is engaged. But it is also important
to determine whether a particular arm of the government is a municipal
corporation or a political subdivision of the state. In a civil appeals case"1
the court held that a navigational district was not a municipal corporation
but rather a political subdivision of the state and, as such, had governmental immunity. The issue was also raised in another civil appeals decision concerning a hospital district. 8 In that case the court considered
whether this was really a political subdivision or not but determined that
regardless of how it was classified, the function performed was governmental in nature and therefore was entitled to immunity.
GorerninentalFunctions. While the supreme court was not called on to
deal with the issue of what is a governmental function during the period
covered by this Survey, there were several interesting cases in the courts of
civil appeals. Probably the most interesting situation was where the plaintiff, a prisoner, brought a negligence action because he was blinded by a
tear gas gun fired by an officer attempting to quell a riot in a jail.', The
facts showed that the officer was definitely engaged in a governmental
function and therefore the case would not have warranted discussion.
However, the court was faced with the novel argument that the supreme
court in three cases had abrogated the doctrine of municipal immunity
from tort liability in Texas."° The court gave its analysis of the above
cited cases and determined that in all of them the city was engaged either
in a proprietary function or in a mixed function and that none of the cases
dealt with a function which was purely governmental. It pointed out that
since Dancer v. City of Houston,4 1 the court has twice refused to consider
cases in which the function was governmental.' *
One case dealt with the question of an intentional tort as contrasted to
negligence. The court here again applied the concept of governmental immunity where an independent school district was involved.' However, the
proceeding was a case in which the court was dealing with a political
subdivision of the state rather than a municipal corporation."
" Jones v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 397 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
aSArseneau v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 408 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). This
case is of value to attorneys in that the court collected the cases in which the Texas Supreme Court
and courts of civil appeals have determined what activities are political subdivisions of the state.
asLuvaul v. City of Eagle Pass, 408 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'°The appellant had cited Crow v. City of San Antonio, 157 Tex. 250, 301 S.W.2d 628
(1957); City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753 (1960); and Dancer v. City
of Houston, 384 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1964). The Dancer case will be discussed again in this section.
41 384 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1964).
42 Bean v. City of Monahans, 403 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e.;
Mayes v. City of Wichita Falls, 403 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.re.
" Russell v. Edgewood Ind. School Dist., 406 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
note 2 supra and accompanying text.
"See
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ProprietaryFunctions. Texas has always recognized that where a municipal corporation is engaged in a proprietary function, it is liable for its
negligence. During the period under question the appellate courts were
called on to review several cases dealing with what is a proprietary function. A civil appeals case concerned a six-year-old child who was with his
family at a public picnic area.'" The youth wandered away from his parents and onto an adjacent public golf course. The city had left barrels of
liquid fertilizer on the course. One barrel had a spigot, which was easily
accessible. Leaving the barrel in such a position violated orders of the city
manager. The child drank from the spigot and died. The city attempted to
avoid liability on grounds that a green fee was charged for use of the
course and that while it might be liable to persons who had paid for the
privilege of playing golf, it was not liable in the situation where the child
was a trespasser, or at most a licensee and therefore took the premises as he
found them. As to this argument, the court took the position that the
child was the equivalent of an invitee, that the fee was for the privilege
of playing, that it was common knowledge that golfers were often followed by members of the family or other onlookers and that the city
should have anticipated that there would be persons other than golfers on
the course. The city was negligent; 'the function was proprietary and
liability was sustained. This case was one in which liability also could have
been based on the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
In another case the owner of a boat house brought an action based upon
the negligence of city employees in removing boats from Lake Waco."
The court was faced with the problem of deciding the lake's function. The
court reasoned that although the lake was used to supply city watee, it
was also used for pleasure boats; therefore the mixed governmental and
proprietary function made the city liable.
The final case of significance was one in which the city was held liable
for negligence resulting in an accident caused by failure to make proper
inspection of garbage trucks."7 The court held that the collection of garbage (a governmental function) did not include the question of repair
and inspection of the trucks and therefore was a function for which the

city was liable.
Contributory Negligence. In a case of first instance th.e court of civil
appeals held that the defense of contributory negligence was available to
4"City of Lampasas v. Roberts,
'City of Waco v. Busby, 396
*TCity of Houston v. Celaya,
case appears to be an extension of

398 S.W.2d
S.W.2d 469
390 S.W.2d
Houston v.

612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. nre.
542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).. error ref. n.r.e. This
Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 240 S.W.2d 1010 (1951).
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an individual defendant in an action in which the city was the plaintiff.'
The facts involved an accident between a police car and a citizen. The
court reasoned that when a city sues an individual for negligence, the defendant is entitled to assert all defenses because there is no liability sought
against the city, only an extinguishment of the entire cause of action.
Nuisance. The appellate courts have had no difficulty in sustaining a
complaint which is grounded in nuisance. Two cases came before the courts
during the last term, but in only one of them did the court determine that
the city was liable. In one civil appeals case the court restated the concept of nuisance and set out the elements to be considered in determining
the amount of damages.' It was held that the property owners were entitled to accrued interest on permanent damages in addition to the market
value of the property. In a second civil appeals case the court dismissed
an action in nuisance, holding that the provision of civil statutes article
758a did not apply to a situation in which the city of Dallas had widened
a creek, thereby causing an overflow on plaintiff's property, as this was
not a diversion within the terms of the statute. The court did recognize,
however, that the statute was applicable to municipal corporations."
Notice of Claims. Most city charters require a set period of time and a
procedure under which claimanlts must file any claim against the municipality. The supreme court discussed the issue of the manner in which this
must be accomplished in Dancer v. City of Houston" and held that mere
substantial compliance with the charter provisions is sufficient. Despite this,
the courts of civil appeals have seemingly overlooked the Dancer ruling.
In one case, where an affidavit which was required by the charter was not
supplied, the court held that strict compliance was necessary." Two other
cases indicated that something less than the Dancer standard need be met
-where there are special circumstances. In one instance, where the plaintiff
was only seven years old, the court remanded the case because it felt that it
was a question of fact as to whether a minor of that age should be held to
literal compliance with the charter provisions. 3 The second case held that
in view of the fact that the city itself was performing the work with its
own employees, and the plaintiff was an employee, the city had actual notice and literal compliance with the charter provisions was not required."
r'Faulk v. City of Tyler, 389 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.; Brin, Contributory Ncgligence of Municipal Corporations, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 510 (1948); Note, 23 TENN.
L. REV. 908 (1955).
" City of Abilene v. Downs, 386 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
'0 Stoner v. City of Dallas, 392 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. .r.e.
5'Supra note 41.
" Smith v. City of Dallas, 404 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
5 Simpson v. City bf Abilene, 388 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.'r.e.; Lubbock v. Cement & Supply Co., 384 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. ir.e.
"'Smith v. City of Dallas, 404 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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VII. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS"*

In City of Big Spring v. Board of Control," it was held that a water
contract entered into by the city of Big Spring in 1937 to sell water to a
hospital at a stipulated rate so long as the hospital was operated at the
present site was valid. The supreme court upheld this contract against the
objection that it lacked definite terms and that it abdicated the legislative
functions of the city. The court concluded that the termination date was
supplied by the condition of continued occupation of the site; hence it was
not subject to the rule that where no term is specified, the contract may be
ended after a reasonable time. As to the second contention, the court declared that the express power of the city to contract would authorize
entering into this contract. A dissenting opinion took the view that a city
should not be permitted to enter into indefinite-length contracts impairing their financial capacities in the future.
In Big Spring the court pointed to the broad contracting power conferred upon cities under article 1108, section 3, namely to sell water from
its waterworks under such terms and conditions as "may appear to be for
the best interest of such town or city." The court, disposing of the argument that the contract abdicated the city's legislative power insofar as it
agreed to supply water to the hospital for so long as the hospital was
maintained by the state at the site, emphasized the breadth of the discretion conferred by the statute and stated that courts should not intervene
except in instances of clear abuse. This abuse does not take place "unless the
contracts made by them are unreasonable, inequitable and unfair or tainted
with fraud or illegality." ' The decision of the court in this case was sound.
The contract was not indefinite, since the asserted indefinite provision was
clarified by other terms of the contract. The issue of whether the contract
was too unreasonable to be entered into by a municipal corporation was
resolved by applied judgment to all the facts and circumstances of its
making, in particular the tangible and intangible quid pro quo of construction of a new state hospital at a site provided by the city."
Another case involving a contract was where a motel association brought
a declaratory judgment action to prevent the operation of a Howard Johnson motel on land leased from the Texas Turnpike Authority to the de" An instructive series of comments relative to "Contracting with the State of Texas" appears
in a recent issue of the Texas Law Review. These comments focus upon the subject. of contracting with the state rather than with local government, though some reference to political subdivisions of th stateis included. O'Neill, The Purchasing System, 44 T.XAs L. REv. 58 (1965);
Grossberg, The Competitive Bidding Requirement, id. at 82; Susman Fiscal and Constitutional
Limitations, id at 106; Schoenbrun, Sovereign Immnnunity, id at 151.
5'404 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1966). For further discussion see Harding, Contracts, this Survey at
footnote 35.
57
1d. at 817.
s,See Little Falls Elec. & Water Co. v. City of Little Falls, 102 Fed. 663 (D. Minn. 1900).
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fendant for that purpose."° The contention, in the civil appeals court, was
that under the statutes the Authority had power to condemn land only as
necessary for road and right-of-way purposes, that it had obtained this
tract by deed through threat of condemnation proceedings, and that the
motel was not reasonably necessary to the operation of a turnpike project. The court of civil appeals pointed out that another section of the
statute authorized the Authority to contract with any person for use of the
right-of-way adjoining the paved road for the use of hotels, that the present use was in accordance with the power conferred, and that it was a
governmental function. The court further said that, except for due process rights under the Constitution, there is no inherent right of appeal
from the action of an administrative agency and that Arlington here had
no justiciable interest. The court refused to equate the asserted economic
harm to the plaintiffs, resulting from a less favorable competitive position
for the patronage of Turnpike users, with a property interest. This view is
consistent with past decisions, provided expenditure of tax funds or misuse of public funds is not in issue and a statute does not liberalize doctrines of standing to sue.
VIII.

MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS

It is somewhat unusual for a public authority in Texas to issue bonds

as a means of purchasing the land, facilities and all capital stock of a pri0 rather
vate corporation, as occurred in Brazos River Authority v. Carr,"
than enter upon a developmental project of its own. Texas long has been
strict in its interpretation of the constitutional prohibition of subscription by public bodies in stock of private corporations. Here, however, the
supreme court denied the applicability of article 3, sections 50-53 and
article 2, section 3 of the Texas Constitution and held that since all the
stock of the private corporation was acquired by the Authority, the dissolution of the private corporations would result. The court distinguished
its strict rule applied to municipal purchase of mutual insurance by stating that: "The Authority is not entering into a joint venture with private
enterprise or becoming a participating stockholder. ' ' "t
As a practical matter, the view taken by the court on the constitutional
question is significant, since it settles the question for this state that purchase by a public body of stock in a private corporation is not illegal when
immediate dissolution of the private corporation effectively prevents the
" Arlington Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 397 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e.
60405 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1966).
" City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 288 S.W. 409 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926). The
case of Morrow v. Myers, 282 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e. was disapproved
to the extent of the conflict therewith.
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Authority from becoming a stockholder in a private corporation. Thus, the
public body may purchase stock rather than things, provided a sufficiency
of stock is purchased.
A "hold harmless" agreement in behalf of the United States, made by
a Texas county in relation to a bridge project, was upheld by the supreme
court in Brown v. Jefferson County." The court held the agreement of the
county to save the United States free from damages that could result from
construction did not violate article 11, section 7, of the Texas Constitution.
That article prohibits a debt unless provision is made for levying and collecting a tax sufficient to meet the interest and establish the prescribed
sinking fund. It was held that since the resolution of the county provided
for annual collection of taxes to establish a sinking fund, the unpredictability of the amount needed to meet such a contingent liability as the
hold harmless clause created did not bar the exercise of the discretion of
the commissioners' court to fix the rate. It was noted further that since the
county would own the bridge upon completion, any damages would be
determined in a comparatively short period of time. Dissenting justices
would have declared the resolution void since, under such a clause, the extent of debt that could arise could not be known. A previous Texas decision held an indemnity agreement to be a "debt" within the Texas Constitution; the majority distinguished the decision as involving circumstances under which no provision was made for meeting such debt, and the
dissenters found a parallel in the decision. 3 The holding of the court in
the present case appears basically pragmatic, recognizing that the federal
government requires, as a matter of policy, that it be held harmless in
such project undertakings.
IX.

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS"

In City of Houston v. Blackbird,' the court of civil appeals held that a
city council was guilty of arbitrary action in (1) determining that the
property owners abutting on the north side of a new street would be benefited six dollars per foot, whereas those abutting on the south side received
no benefits and (2) permitting the abutters on the south side to agree that
they would not use the street for access while refusing to make such an
02406 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1966), affirming All Persons Interested, Etc., v. Jefferson County, 397
S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
63
Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Galveston County, 141 Tex. 34, 169 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1943).
" Special assessments, though commonly sustained under-the exercise of the power of taxation,
differ from general taxes, since they are special and local impositions upon the property in the
immediate vicinity of municipal improvements, which are necessary to pay for the improvements,
and are laid with reference to the special benefit which the property is supposed to have derived
from the improvement.
65 384 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For further discussion see FitzGerald, Administrative
Law, this Survey at footnote 96.
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agreement with the abutters on the north side. The supreme court
affirmed,6' holding that the city council's finding was arbitrary because
the property to the north actually decreased in value as a result of the
improvements, and was thus based on an unreasonable determination of
special benefits which by statute must be shown at least to equal the special assessment made against the property.
In another special assessment case, the court of civil appeals looked at
the facts and applied the special benefits requirements constitutionally
underlying imposition of special assessments against owners of properties
abutting public improvements."' The court reversed and rendered the trial
court's affirmance of a street assessment, of which one-half the cost was to
be paid by abutting owners. Two of the properties involved, though
within the city, were in farm use, and the testimony indicated that it was
speculative whether they would have value for more urban type use for
eight or ten years. For farm use the assessments would have exceeded the
value of the special benefits. Moreover, it appeared to the court that the
street improvements were related to a new high school nearby, raising a
question of whether the primary benefit was for the public generally
rather than for the abutting lands.
X.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

The courts have been asked to consider several questions concerning
public officials, personnel and their dependents during the last term.
Justiciable Issue. In a civil appeals case"6 a former chief of police was
denied an action for declaratory judgment. The former policeman sued to
stop payment of his successor's salary on grounds that this was an illegal
expenditure of funds. His claim of standing to sue was on the basis of being a tax-paying citizen. The court denied this claim because the plaintiff
did not have sufficient interest in the alleged issue of illegal expenditure of
funds."'
In Board of Fireman's Relief & Retirement Funds v. Hamilton"' the
court held that, while a disabled fireman's avenue of review was to the
Fireman's Pension Commissioner, in the event of his death his widow's
recourse from the action of the board of trustees was directly to the district court. This was so even though the statute itself gave no right of
appeal; otherwise there would be a denial of due process.
66

394 S.W.2df159

(Tex. 1965).

"'Page v. City of Lockhart, 397 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
68 Hamman v. Hayes, 391 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref.
9 The court did indicate that the appropriate remedy might be quo warranto although, even
here, the courts had not considered in such an action the question of the expenditure of illegal
funds. See also Willis v. City of Lubbock, 385 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.,
wherein the city's voluntary computation of accrued vacation leave was not subject to judicial
review.
70386 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1965).

